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The increasing complexity of information and telecommunications systems and networks
is reaching a level beyond human ability, mainly from the security assessment viewpoint.
Methodologies currently proposed for managing and assuring security requirements fall
short of industrial and societal expectations. The statistics about vulnerabilities and
attacks show that the security, reliability and availability objectives are not reached and
that the general threat situation is getting worse. With the deployment of Next Generation
Networks e NGNs, the complexity of networks, considering their architecture, speed and
amount of connections, will increase exponentially. There are several proposals for the
network and security architectures of NGNs, but current vulnerability, threat and risk
analysis methods do not appear adequate to evaluate them. Appropriate analysis methods
should have some additional new characteristics, mainly regarding their adaptation to the
continuous evolution of the NGNs. In addition, the application of security countermeasures
will require technological improvements, which will demand further security analyses.
This paper evaluates the current vulnerability, threat and risk analysis methods from the
point of view of the new security requirements of NGNs. Then, the paper proposes to use
autonomic and self-adaptive systems/applications for assuring the security of NGNs.
Crown Copyright ª 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction technological improvements or implementations can be theCommunications technologies are evolving fast, following the
demand for more and newer services anywhere and at any
time. The drivers for this trend come from the economy,
military defense, health and education fields, and match the
request for more efficiency, and more comfortable and safe
daily life. As a rule, new technologies are put into use as soon
as they are available.
The many technological developments accomplished in
the last decades have a direct impact on communication
networks. Nevertheless, all hardware and softwarented at the Broadnets 200
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right ª 2010 Published bysource of new vulnerabilities for the systems and services that
rely upon them. The statistical reports about the changing
intensity and type variety of security vulnerabilities and
attacks show that integrity, reliability and availability prob-
lems are far from being solvede see Figs. 1 and 2 (IBM Internet
Security Systems X-Force, 2009).
As shown in Fig. 1, the number of reported vulnerabilities
in “Cisco 2008 Annual Report” increased, compared to 2007, by
11.5 percent (Cisco, 2009).
According to “IBM Internet Security Systems X-Force 2009
Mid-Year Trend”, as shown in Fig. 2, the disclosure rate of9 Conference in Madrid, Spain, 14e17 Sept. 2009, and published by
.
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Fig. 1 e Cumulative Annual Alert Totals by month.
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vulnerabilities such as SQL injections and ActiveX controls.
According to theCisco“2009AnnualReport”, theexploit and
attack threat levels increased by 57 percent when comparing
the 2008 and 2009 values. In 2009 the new attacks generally
affect social media users, exploiting their willingness to
respond to messages that supposedly originate from people
they know and trust. This kind of attacks is relatively easy to
launch, and can be deployed to steal personal information.
Nowadays, the telecommunication infrastructure is in
a conversionphase towardsNextGenerationNetworkseNGNs.
According to ITU’s Telecommunication Standardization Sector
e ITU-T report “Trends inTelecommunicationReform: theRoad
to NGN” published in September 2007, it is predicted that full
implementation of NGN in fixed line networks in developed
countries will be deployed by 2012 and in mobile networks by
2020 (Next-Generation Networks and Energy Efficiency, 2008).
With this new network infrastructure, information can be
reachable whenever and wherever, by who needs it. Hence, in
the corporate world, the border between traditional company
and office environments will diminish. Naturally these devel-
opments will inevitably come with many still unknown
vulnerabilities, threats, and security risk.
In line with the aforementioned reports, the Centre for the
Protection of National Infrastructure e CPNI, in the report on
the identificationof thehighconsequence risks facedby theUK
(National Risk Register of UK Government, 2008), highlights
that the expanding interconnectivity among networks influ-
ences the probabilities and impact of attacks within an NGN0
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Fig. 2 e Vulnerability Disclosures in the 1st half of each
Year 2000-2009.scenario. See Fig. 3 as an illustration of this trend towards
scenarios characterized by high-impact, high-likelihood risk.
Of particular relevance are the so-called Critical Infrastruc-
ture. Companies and operators in the banking and finance
sectors, energy and natural resources, telecommunications and
internet service providers, transportation and mass transport,
chemical production and storage, food distribution and govern-
ment services are considered critical infrastructure eas their
disturbance or disruption can severely impair society at large.
The report “In theCrossfire; Critical Infrastructure in theAge
of CyberWar” publishedby the anti-virus companyMcAfee and
coordinated by the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies inWashington,DC in January, 2010, discusses this latter
problemThe report is based on data froma survey of 600 IT and
security executives in enterprises that own and/or operate
critical infrastructure in 14 countries across the world. The
survey data gathered for the report paints for the first time
a detailed picture of theway those in charge of the protection of
critical ITnetworks are responding to cyber-attacks, attempting
to secure their systems and working with governments.
According to this report; 80 percent of executives working for
entities that use SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion) or industrial Control Systems say their systems are con-
nected to the internet or someother IPnetwork, putting themat
possible risk of intrusion (http://img.en25.com/Web/McAfee/
NA_CIP_RPT_REG_2840.pdf).
This situation forces research institutes and standardization
bodies to adapt their research areas, rules and policies to meet
thesecurityneedsof thenewtechnological improvements.Akey
issue is the lack of an adequate approach to guarantee that all
security requirements will be satisfied. ITU-T presented a secu-
rity model (ITU-T X-805, 2002) applicable to NGN, composed of
three security layers, three security planes, and eight security
dimensions. Although providing a comprehensive view of
network security, puts stringent demands that could be difficult
to satisfy in realistic settings, mainly due to the continuous
changes in technologies and system architectures. Although
security has been recognized as a key enabler and differentiator
for NGN, its eventual assurance is still an open question.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the possible integration
of the proposed ITU-T security model with new additionalFig. 3 e An illustration of the high consequence risks with
NGNs.
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bilities, threats, and to react accordingly.
This paper looks at the security framework for NGNs from
a methodological viewpoint. It should be considered that
interdisciplinary researches for new technologies are
currently being developed looking for new alternative security
solutions for NGNs and future networks. Key questions are
what has to be protected, and how it has to be protected. The
first question concerns both the users and operators of NGN;
while the second is influenced by the available technologies
and security techniques. These cannot have a final answer,
and therefore we defend that any workable and effective
solution will have to continuously adapt itself to the imple-
mentation and use of NGN systems.
The paper is organized in the following sections; Sections 2
and 3 include information about the NGN general functional
architecture (ITU-T Recommendation Y, 2001) and the secu-
rity architecture model (ITU-T X-805, 2002) proposed by the
International Telecommunication Union e ITU-T. Section 4
describes the deficiencies of current security solutions and
Vulnerability, Threat, Risk AnalysisMethods. Section 5 defines
the basic requirements and capabilities for new security
solution approaches for NGNs. Section 6 presents the
conclusions and future work.Fig. 4 e General Functional Model for NGN (ITU-T Y.2011).2. NGN architecture model
The aim of NGN is to collect existing networks into unitary
packet-based network architecture (ITU-T Y-2001, 2004). The
service-related functions in NGNs are independent of the
transport technologies (ITU-T Y-2011, 2004). NGN is defined
technically by the ITU-T as a “packet-based network able to
provideservices including telecommunicationservicesandable
to make use of multiple broadband, quality of service e QoS
enabled transport technologies and in which service-related
functions are independent from underlying transport-related
technologies”(ITU-T Recommendation Y, 2001).
ITU-T has proposed a standardization studies roadmap for
NGN security. The details of security standardization topics
for the current Study Period (2009e2012) were proposed at the
September 2008 meeting of ITU-T (http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/
studygroups/com17/ict/part04.html). Due to the high speed
of technological changes, lots of critical security analysis are
under development or have just been planned. Obviously no
solution can be thoroughly accepted before a complete
understanding of the problem space.
The current key concepts for NGN architecture are:(ITU-T
Y-2012, 2006)
 Separation between service and transport,
 Personal and terminal mobility,
 Resource and admission control,
 Quality of Service selection & control,
 Security,
 Accommodation of legacy terminals and systems.
The service convergence in NGN will provide the ability to
deliver voice, video, audio and visual data via session and
interactive based services in unicast, multicast and broadcastmodes. This convergence uses both wireline and wireless
technologies, which can be applied interchangeably for the
delivery of services. The vision is that NGN could be used any
time and anywhere across various environments using
compatible terminal equipments. For accomplishing this aim,
the architecture of NGN is separated into two strata: trans-
portation and services. Each stratum includes management
and control functions, and resources. Fig. 4 presents the
General Functional Model for NGNs.3. NGN security architecture model (ITU-T
X-805, 2002)
The NGN Security architecture was designed by ITU-T in order
to propose solutions for the following ques-
tions:(NanoTechnology & Homeland Security, 2003)
1. What kinds of protection are needed and against what
threats?
2. What are the distinct types of network equipment and
facility groupings that need to be protected?
3. What are the distinct types of network activities that need
to be protected?
ITU-T Recommendations X.805 presents the ‘Security
Architecture for Systems Providing End-to-End Communica-
tions’. They were proposed as the framework for the NGN
architecture for achieving end-to-end security in distributed
applications. They provide a comprehensive, multi-layered,
end-to-end network security framework across eight security
dimensions in order to combat network security threats. It also
forms the foundation for the proposed ISO/IEC 18028 standard
‘Information technology e Security techniques e Network
Security ePart2: Network security architecture’.
Fig. 6 e The continuous security gap between technology
and standards.
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control, authentication, non-repudiation, data confidentiality,
communication security, data integrity, availability, and
privacy.
The NGN Security Layers are a hierarchy of equipment and
facilities organized as three layers: infrastructure security
layer, service security layer, and application security layer, as
shown in Fig. 5. Each layer relates to unique vulnerabilities,
threats and mitigation measures.
The NGN Security Planes comprises the types of security-
related activities that are typically deployed on a network.
They are; management security plane, control security plane,
end-user security plane. Each security plane has to be inter-
connected with each security layer, so resulting in nine
security perspectives. Each security perspective corresponds
to unique vulnerabilities and threats.4. The deficiencies of current security
Solutions and vulnerability, threat, risk analysis
methods
The information technology security requirements and
objectives for NGNs are defined by ISO/IEC 15408 Part 2 (ISO/
IEC 15408e2,). The main objective is controlling the security
risks to an acceptable level for all stakeholders of NGNs.
As shown in Figs. 1,2 and 3 in the previous sections, secu-
rity risks are growing and cannot be ignored. Attacks are
becoming more sophisticated, unpredictable, frequent and
from a wider range of sources. On the other hand, the existing
standards, solutions or methodologies do not appear to
sufficiently support the required security assessments.
Standardization has a very important role in the achieve-
ment of security objectives. However, technologies are
developing very fast and the research and standardization
organizations do not have enough time to analyze all possible
vulnerabilities and threats before technologies are deployed.
See an illustration of this situation in Fig. 6. For instance; the
web site of ITU-T for ‘ICT Security Standards Roadmap, future
needs and proposed new security standards’ in web site of
ITU-T Part 4 (http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/
ict/part04.html) defines the current process for NGN, whileFig. 5 e ITU-T X.805 security architecture; ‘three security
layers’ X ‘three security planes’ X ‘8 security dimensions’.NGNs have already been deployed in many developed coun-
tries such as Japan, South Korea, USA, China, UK etc.
There are several reasons for the insufficiency of the
currentmethods for analyzing vulnerabilities, threat and risks
as reference studies to reach security objectives and stan-
dardization of NGNs. We can list these reasons as follows:
 Each newNGN service can include different compositions of
many new technological equipment and software solutions,
and these compositions entail different complex threats
and risks. The composition of services does not necessarily
imply that the upper services inherit the security attributes
of its components. Each new composition adds and
amplifies vulnerabilities and threats, and therefore each
new service would require a specific security analysis. For
instance, the traditional communication network ‘PSTN’, its
protocols and the Internet infrastructure are used together
for VoIP.
 Vulnerabilitiesderive fromerrorsoroversights inthedesignof,
e.g. the protocols. This makes them inherently vulnerable, for
example SIP, 802.11b (Thermos, 2006). SIP (Session Initiation
Protocol) as an IP based signaling protocol, which is used by
globalVoice over Internet providers andplaysmajor roleNGN-
based telecommunication networks (Weber & Trick,). As
amatterof fact,protocolsaredeployedwithoutacompleteand
unquestionable proof of their security properties. During their
lifetime, protocols change, incorporating patching and
evolvingwith theadditionofnewfeatures. Eachnewversion is
vulnerable in some ways not totally known when being
deployed, and differing from its previous versions.
 The current vulnerability, threat and risk analysis method-
ologies such as e-TVRA for NGNs (Rossebø et al.,Cadzow,
2004) typically focus on known threats and vulnerabilities
e because this is the available information. All threats,
vulnerability and risk analysis methods continuously need
to update their knowledge of new weaknesses of the assets
being studied, to identify how these weaknesses can be
exploited, for then evaluating the security risk, and defining
and implementing the needed countermeasures. As the
information basis for those analyses is incomplete, new
evaluationswill be needed in time. The set of security data is
never complete, and assessments should be redone with
each series of new data. In addition, it is known that infor-
mation on attacks is not promptly disclosed due to their
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eration for remaking the security assessment of the systems
for which it is relevant. Therefore the improvement of NGN
security systems via vulnerability, threat and risk analysis
tool is a time consuming and always incomplete process.
 Pfleeger in 2000 (Pfleeger, 2000) defined risk as any unwanted
event that might have negative consequences. Different
methodologies for riskand threat assessment suchasCarroll
1996, Nosworthy 2000, Summers 1977, Pfleeger 2000, R.C.
Reid 2001 and Bayne 2002, define risk with regard to the
threats and threat agents known to the users. Today, total
threat assessments are rarely possible due to the complexity
of systems and networks: threat scenarios can affect many
components, generate intricate and multifaceted failure
mechanisms, and propagate within the systems in compli-
catedways (e.g. in long times, with small progressions, etc.).
So, NGN risk models cannot ignore this situation.
 Another required feature is security measurement (Jaquith,
2007). No security measurement definition and tool has
proven its logical and mathematically validity. Therefore
the security of NGN systems cannot be determined in
absolute terms, although there is the need to measure in
someway the fulfillment of the security requirements. From
this the need for appropriate security measurements and
metrics. This is fundamental for evaluating whether new
security scenarios or solutions have positive or negative
effects upon the NGN network and its services.
 An important attribute of any security evaluation is uncer-
tainty e which depends on time and the chosen reference
values. As security is a function of time, evaluations should
provide a proper answer about its evolution, and its depen-
dency upon the changes in different factors. In addition, as
NGN systems put togethermany actors, securitymight have
different quantitative values for each one of them. The
measurement of security should be a continuous activity,
dynamically evolving according to the changes in the NGN
architecture and service, and to the points of view various
stakeholders.5. The proposed security solution approach
Current standardsdonot appear toestablishall desired security
solutions and risk control capabilities for NGN as partially
admitted in ITU-T0s ‘ICT Security Standards Roadmap, future
needs and proposed new security standards’ (http://www.itu.
int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/ict/part04.html). In addition,
available vulnerability, threat and risk analysismethods do not
appear to be able to efficiently evaluate the security of NGN
networksandservicesdue to the reasonspresented insection4.
The main goal of the approach we are presenting for NGN
security is to help in reducing the window of opportunity for
the security problems that will inevitably continue to appear.
The requirements of the new security approach are as
follows:
 Current security problems have stochastic characteristics.
The vulnerabilities and attack types can have many
unpredictable combinations. The established security levelcannot be measured and guaranteed by current available
solutions. Therefore new security approaches shouldmatch
the nature of the security problems, capable of adapting the
strategy to new threats/attacks and of generating solutions
dynamically.
 A successful security approach should be deployable and
feasible for all network components, either hardware or
software.
 The security approach should be effective against new kinds
of attack.
 The responses of the security approach should be moni-
tored and controlled. The collected information about
vulnerabilities and new attacks should be processed to
improve the security level of the system. This critical
information collection and exchange should be organized
and managed using secure information sharing models.
This approachwill require the application of concepts such
as self-adaptation and autonomic systems/applications.
Autonomic computing should provide NGN architectures
with the capability of self-managing their security status,
overcoming unpredictable security incidents, while hiding the
complexity of the overall NGN architecture to each element
facing the security problem.
A step forward should be the introduction of self-adapta-
tion mechanisms, which could support the change of the
behavior or of the structure of NGN software components for
adapting them temporarily or permanently to some new
security condition.
In addition, this approach will require the permanent
collection of data about vulnerabilities, threats and attacks,
which then can foster the analysis of the security conditions
of the NGN systems, and prepare their reaction to the related
security scenarios.
In this section, we define the concepts of autonomic
systems/applications and self-adaptive systems. Then, we
explain how these approaches can be used for improving the
security architecture of NGNs, and their vulnerability, threat
and risk assessments.
5.1. Autonomic computing for NGNs
NGNs are conceived to be composed of many systems and
networks, globally aggregating large numbers of independent
computing and communication resources, data stores and
sensor networks. For security purposes, the self-immunity of
systems is an ideal key requirement: i.e. systems that can
recognize potential threats and react in an self-governing way
towards an acceptable secure state. This approach can be
a security solution for NGN that implements an autonomous
entity (Internal Functional Architecture of Autonomic
Element, 2001), as depicted Fig. 7 (derived from work by
IBM). An autonomic application/system is a collection of
autonomic elements, which implement intelligent control
loops to monitor, analyze, plan and execute actions, using
knowledge of the environment by hardware and software
entities.
It has to be supported by local sensor mechanisms, for
instance for detecting threats or identifying faults in vulner-
able components. Detecting security problems in local
Fig. 7 e The Autonomous Element.
Fig. 8 e Proposed Security Solution for NGNs with
Autonomous systems/applications.
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logical systems when they have to deal with similar chal-
lenges of scale, complexity, heterogeneity, and uncertainty e
a vision that has been referred to as autonomic computing
(Hariri and Parashar, 2005).
NGN networks can use autonomic applications/systems to
handle complexity and uncertainties with minimum human
intervention. Autonomic applications and systems have eight
characteristics (Horn, Oct 2001):
1. Self Awareness: It “knows itself” and is aware of its state and
its behaviors.
2. Self Configuring: It should be able configure and reconfigure
itself under varying and unpredictable conditions.
3. Self Optimizing: It should be able to detect suboptimal
behaviors and optimize itself to improve its execution.
4. Self-Healing: It should be able to detect and recover from
potential problems and continue to function smoothly.
5. Self Protecting: It should be capable of detecting and pro-
tecting its resources from both internal and external
attacks and maintaining overall system security and
integrity.
6. Context Awareness: It should be aware of its execution
environment and be able to react to changes in it.
7. Open: It must function in a heterogeneous world and should
be portable across multiple hardware and software archi-
tectures. Consequently it must be built on standard and
open protocols and interfaces.
8. Anticipatory: It should be able to anticipate to the most
possible extent, its needs and behaviors and those of its
context, and be able to manage itself proactively.
The usability of autonomic applications/systems by NGN
would be an important leap forward, and currently several
research efforts are focused on enabling autonomic properties
to address four main areas: self-healing, self-protection, self-
configuration, and self-optimization. At the hardware level,
systems may be dynamically upgradable, while at the oper-
ating system level, active code may be replaced dynamically.
Efforts have also focused on autonomic middleware,
programming systems and runtime. At the application level,
self-optimizing databases and web servers dynamically
reconfigure to adapt service performance. These efforts havedemonstrated both the feasibility and promise of autonomic
application/system (Parashar and Hariri, 2005).
The main issue for the proposed autonomic network
components of NGNs is that each element has to be designed
with the overall architecture in mind, and generally can only
be add-on afterwards with difficulty. Delayed introduction of
autonomic attributes could hamper the overall functionality
of the NGN architecture.5.2. Self-adaptive systems for NGN services and
applications
Self-adaptive features for security purposes can be added to
software NGN components, in the different security layers
and planes foreseen for theNGNarchitecture, and considering
the different security dimensions as depicted in Fig. 8. How
this solution can implement the ITU-T X.805 security archi-
tecture and improve the e-TVRA (threat, vulnerability and risk
analysis) method for NGNs, will be discussed in section D.
In general terms, the architecture of autonomic systems
consists of autonomic elements, each performing a fixed
function and interacting with other elements, possibly in very
dynamic environments. An autonomic element is commonly
viewed as being comprised of one or more managed elements
(also referred to as functional units), each performing its
operational function, with one autonomic manager
(management unit) that controls the managed elements’
configuration, inputs, and outputs. The hardware or software
autonomous entities are able to recognize the security prob-
lems (self-healing, -protection), sharing information with
other autonomic NGN components (context awareness), for
then selecting the more appropriate reaction behavior and
implementing the necessary changes (self-optimizing and
configuring) for the whole system.
This architecture with self-describing, self-organizing,
self-managing, self-configuring, and self-optimizing features
can provide a seamless communications infrastructure
composed of multiple technologies and able to leverage local
information and decisions without sacrificing global perfor-
mance, robustness, and trustworthiness.
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stratum, and can affect management or control functions,
resource or function elements. Self-adaptation can change the
behavior of a component, or the structure of a system,
affecting their input/output, operations (e.g. filtering),
resource access, resource monitoring, management of other
components, etc.
For this end, the autonomic characteristics described in
the previous section are an essential element, acting as the
sensor system of NGN networks. The self-adaptive applica-
tions should monitor and organize the global reaction, such
as the immune system of a living organism. In a self-adap-
tive system and/or network, services are able to recognize
the security problems, sharing information with other
autonomic NGN components, for then selecting the more
appropriate reaction behavior and implementing the
necessary changes.
Requirements for self-adaptive systems were discussed by
Horward Shrobe in 2001 (Shrobe, 2001). Then a project was
started in MIT for developing the concept. The aim of their
project was that of restructuring software applications as self-
adaptive survivable systems to protect infrastructures. Those
software systems must be informed by a trust model that
indicates which resources are to be trusted. When such
a system starts a task, it chooses the method that the trust
model indicates as most likely to avoid compromised
resources. In addition, such a system must be capable of
detecting its own malfunctioning, diagnose the respective
failure, and consequently repair itself. For example, a system
might notice through self-monitoring that it is running much
slower than expected (Shrobe, November 4, 2002). The central
idea in self-adaptive systems is that in many cases computer
systemsmay have more than one way to perform a task. Self-
adaptive systems involve making dynamic choices between
such alternatives. The results of the technical report fromMIT
showed that (Shrobe et al., April 10, 2007) self-awareness and
self-adaptivity can be successfully applied to monitoring the
behavior of systems, diagnose failures, and adapt and recover
from both insider and external attackers.
Thereforeourproposal is todevelopacompleteNGNsecurity
solution including self-adaptive systems and applications,
supported and integratedwith autonomicNGN components. In
other words, smart autonomic network entities as presented in
Fig. 7 are the key element to create a self-adaptive secure NGN
networks. Thereby, the proposed security solution approach
will showthedesiredcharacteristicofdynamicallyevolvingand
reacting according to the best security solutions they can be
implement.
5.3. Both local and end-to-end security solutions are
required
All NGN stakeholders look for end-to-end security solutions.
However (due to the problems previously discussed in section
4) security can only be ensured when the solutions to vulner-
ability, threat and attacks can be initiated locally for then being
coordinated globally. In other words, NGN end-to-end security
objectives depend upon both the satisfaction of security
requirements for local network components, and the coordi-
nation among relevant components in the overall architecture.Faster detection of security issues also means better reac-
tion times. For being effective, security solutions must be
absorbed by all the stakeholders dealing with the NGN
networks and service. Thereby, security should be guaranteed
by and for all the fundamental network operational processes
and network infrastructural elements of NGNs. The end
customers should perceive all these solutions as end-to-end
automatic protection.
The local threat/vulnerability-detection sensormechanisms
are the triggering element for the local immune reaction
systems. All layers of the network architecture should be
proactive and detect local security problems dynamically.
Abnormal situation at the network fundamental service
processes are the most urgent, as they might affect all other
services and applications. Problems, threats or attacks can be
isolated, reported and alternative solutions can be selected and
applied by the local entities e while communicating and inter-
actingwith other entities for guaranteeing the attainment of an
acceptable global solution. An important advantage with
current hardware and software technologies, embedded and
intelligent equipment is that it is possible to implement those
autonomic characteristics and self-adaptability without
affecting the performance of the networks.
In the following we discuss the characteristics of the
proposed approach and how it can be integrated into the ITU-
T X.805 based Vulnerability Analysis Method (e-TVRA) for
NGNs.
5.4. Integration into the NGN architecture and ITU-T
X.805 security architecture
The integration of the proposed approach and the ITU-T X.805
security architecture is important in light of the standardiza-
tion studies and security evaluation of NGNs.
Our approach foresees five main steps for secure NGNs:
1. Designing and implementing NGN autonomic components,
which will provide capabilities for monitoring, self-
management, self-healing, and self-protection, among
others;
2. Designing and implementing NGN self-adaptive software
solutions, which will provide the capabilities for evolving
the security mechanisms by dynamically changing their
behaviors and structure, according to the self-awareness
developed by the NGN autonomic systems;
3. Creating a ‘security information sharing domain’ between
autonomic and self-adaptive components. This domain
requires the definition of information sharing rules and
protocols. It should be organized according to a strict ‘need-
to-know’ rule, segregating and fragmenting the problem
space.
4. Adjusting the typical NGNs network and security architec-
ture for making it suitable to using the autonomic and self-
adaptive solutions.
ITU-T X.805 is a useful framework for understanding NGN
infrastructures and services security issues (Cho et al., 2005),
as it provides a comprehensive, top-down, end-to-end
perspective of NGN security. The two proposed solutions,
autonomic and self-adaptive capabilities by hardware and
Fig. 10 e The interlink between e-TVRA and ITU-T X.805.
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security modules described by ITU-T X.805, as shown in Fig. 5.
There are 9 security modules, which should be analyzed
according to the 8 security dimensions proposed by the ITU-T
X.805 modular structure of NGN security architecture.
While analyzing each of those 9 modules, it is important to
identify their software and hardware entities and the respec-
tive roles with regard to the infrastructure, services and
application layers as depicted in Fig. 9. Then, those entities
have to be re-designed or integrated with new components for
satisfying the required self-adaptive and/or autonomic char-
acteristics that will support the security objectives. This solu-
tion can facilitate the sharing of vulnerability, threat and attack
information across horizontal and vertical layers/planes
among all the related entities. This information sharing can be
established by defining ‘security information sharing domains’.
5. Connecting the ITU-T X.805 Security Architecture and the
e-TVRA security method, with the proposed solution based
on autonomic and self-adaptive capabilities. This interac-
tion will enrich both, the security analysis and the imple-
mentation of the resulting security.
Fig. 10 shows that the restrictions of mutuality between the e-
TVRA (ETSI threat, vulnerability and risk analysis method)
(Rossebø et al.,) and the ITU X.805 NGN security architecture
for NGNs. Also in the figure it is shown the weak point
regarding the handling of information on vulnerabilities,
threats and unwanted incidents. The continuous and prompt
update of this information is fundamental for achieving the
security of the operating NGN systems.Fig. 9 e The proposed solution for the NGN network
architecture as harmonized with the ITU-T X.805 NGN
security architecture model.The continuous information sharing about vulnerability,
threat and attacks can establish horizontal and vertical links
among all related hardware and software components in the
NGN architecture as introduced in Section 5.3. This informa-
tion sharing should be established dynamically and continu-
ously between the NGN architecture and the e-TVRA method
in real time. Thereby both the e-TVRAmodel can be efficiently
applied for assessing the risk and identifying the more
appropriate countermeasures, and the NGN security archi-
tecture can be updated accordingly. In addition this informa-
tion feedback regarding vulnerabilities, threats and risk
analysis can enable the proposed autonomic and self-adap-
tive capabilities. Furthermore, this approach can improve the
speed and completeness of the application of the e-TVRA tool.6. Conclusions
This paper presents the requirements for a new and more
effective security solution approach of NGNs. Due to the
characteristics of the current and future security problems of
NGNs, we argue that the current standardization efforts may
fall short of providing a comprehensive solution. The objec-
tives of proposed solution approach are:
 Localization of the security problems, for assuring their
effective detection and mitigation;
 Information sharing among NGN components,done accord-
ing to need-to-know, segregation and fragmentation rules.
 Vulnerability, threat and risk analysis tools carrying out
more effectively their assessments by exploiting real time
information sharing.
 Creation and use of autonomic and self-adaptive compo-
nents to assure the security, reliability and availability of the
systems and networks.
Themain tools of the proposed solution are autonomic and
self-adaptive applications/systems. They should enable the
choice of the more appropriate security solution for each
circumstance, resulting in the improvement of the security,
i n f o rm a t i o n s e c u r i t y t e c hn i c a l r e p o r t 1 6 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 3e1 1 11availability and reliability of the application and network
services. Future work should take advantage of the many
research projects regarding autonomic and self-adaptive
applications/systems active today ee.g. ‘Autonomic Internet’,
supported by the EC’s FP7 (http://ist-autoi.eu/autoi/; http://
www.future-internet.eu/home.html).
The authors plan to work on reviewing and describing the
security requirements for each stratum and security dimen-
sion of the NGN architecture, in light of possible applications
for autonomic and self-adaptive components.
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